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1Information Gathering, Delegated Contracting,
and Corporate Hierarchies
Abstract
In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to
make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. We study
when such delegation can be optimal. In centralization, the owner retains
the authority, which fails to motivate the manager to acquire valuable infor-
mation, leading to suboptimal decisions and ineﬃcient incentive provision to
the worker. Beneﬁcial delegation should necessarily motivate the manager to
acquire information, which is possible only when the authority is delegated
to the manager. We also document comparative statics results regarding the
beneﬁts of delegation and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate
centralization.
JEL Codes: C72, D21, D82, L22.
Keywords: Corporate hierarchies, information gathering, delegation, central-
ization.
11. Introduction
The so-called separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932;
Fama and Jensen, 1983) refers to the fact that the nominal owners of cor-
porations - shareholders - delegate authority to managers. The authority is
vested in several important dimensions for the top managers of corporations.
They make strategic decisions that set directions for corporations, employ
subordinates, and contract with external suppliers. This multiple dimension
of authority is a deciding factor for the organizational form of corporations.
Rather than a set of two-tier hierarchies in which owners are at the top of
each two-tier hierarchy, modern corporations are often organized as multi-
tier hierarchies.1 Chandler (1977, 1990) attributes such a transformation
of family-oriented “personal capitalism” to “managerial capitalism” in the
US to a sharp increase in demand for, and supply of professional, qualiﬁed
managers as corporations become larger with increasingly sophisticated op-
erations. The resulting modern business enterprise, according to Chandler,
is an organization with many distinct operating units that are managed by
a hierarchy of professional, salaried executives. In such organizations, share-
holders hire top managers - through boards - and managers, in turn, hire
subordinates or contract with external suppliers. Why are such multi-tier
hierarchies, rather than multiple two-tier hierarchies, often the norm? Why
are managers, instead of other stakeholders, at the center of the multi-tier
hierarchy? This study attempts to provide answers to these questions from
an incentive perspective.
A typical explanation for delegation in corporations is based on managers’
expertise and the ensuing beneﬁts of specialization. Jensen and Murphy
(1990, p. 251) put it aptly: “Managers often have better information than
shareholders and boards in identifying investment opportunities and assessing
the proﬁtability of potential projects; indeed, the expectation that managers
will make superior investment decisions explains why shareholders relinquish
decision rights over their assets by purchasing common stocks.” Underlying
this explanation is the assumption that communicating managers’ informa-
tion is costly, or that shareholders or boards do not have necessary expertise
to process the information for decision-making even if communicating the
1Separation of ownership and control in this sense, although not universally the case,
is most prevalent in the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. See La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999).
2information is costless.2 For, otherwise, shareholders or boards will be able
to make decisions based on the information that managers have, which is the
central insight from the revelation principle.
We take Jensen and Murphy’s explanation as a starting point, but go a
step further by assuming that managers need to incur private costs to ac-
quire and process information. The incentive problem becomes relatively
easier without such costs. Our basic model is thus embedded in an envi-
ronment where managers can, at some costs, acquire information necessary
for investment decisions, which cannot be used by shareholders in designing
incentive contracts for managers.
Several authors have resorted to such contractual incompleteness either
implicitly or explicitly to explain why a multi-tier hierarchy with delega-
tion can be superior to a centralized mechanism. In the context of general
revelation mechanisms, Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995) show
that the outcome of an optimal revelation mechanism can be achieved using
decentralized contracts and proper sequencing of the contracts. Thus their
main point is that, when various contracting costs such as those of commu-
nicating information necessary for the revelation mechanism are taken into
account, there may be beneﬁts to delegation. Laﬀont and Martimort (1998)
show that delegation can dominate centralized contracts when the possibility
of collusion down the hierarchy is combined with limits on communication.
The limits on communication, according to these authors, require the central-
ized contracts be anonymous, and diﬀerent agents be treated symmetrically.
This facilitates collusion. With decentralization, such a problem disappears.
The main lesson from these studies is that, to have hierarchical decentraliza-
tion emerge endogenously as an optimal organizational form, there must be
limits to using centralized revelation mechanisms.
Our paper is similar in spirit to the above studies, but has more con-
crete objectives. Speciﬁcally we describe what we believe is a realistic, but
tractable model of a corporate hierarchy, and show when and why putting
managers at the center of the multi-tier hierarchy can beneﬁt sharehold-
ers. The main point of this paper can be explained using a simple scenario.
Consider a ﬁrm that consists of three parties, whom we call the owner, the
manager and the worker. The ﬁrm has two investment projects, for which
2The beneﬁts of hierarchies facing the costs of communicating and processing informa-
tion have been put forward by Arrow (1974) and Williamson (1983) among many others.
3the owner provides necessary funds. The manager can acquire private in-
formation at some costs, which can be used in choosing a right project to
undertake. The worker can exert eﬀort that can increase the likelihood that
the chosen project is successful. Neither the manager’s information nor the
worker’s eﬀort can be used for contracting purpose.
In a centralized mechanism, the owner has the authority to choose a
project based on the manager’s report, and design contracts for both agents
based on the return from the chosen project. Although the manager’s in-
formation cannot be used directly for contracting purpose, it can be used
indirectly through the project choice. In a hierarchical mechanism, authority
is delegated to the agent in the middle of the three-tier contracting relation-
ship: the owner designs a contract for the agent in the middle, who chooses
a project and designs a contract for the other agent. If the manager is del-
egated authority, he makes a project choice based on his own information.
If the worker is delegated authority, he solicits the manager’s information to
make a project choice.
Our main point is that, for a hierarchical mechanism to dominate central-
ized contracting, authority should necessarily be delegated to the manager,
not the worker. The intuition is as follows. In a centralized mechanism, the
owner needs to control both the manager’s incentives for information gath-
ering and truthful report, and the worker’s incentives for optimal eﬀort. The
manager’s information is valuable for project choice and subsequent contract
design for the worker. The worker’s contract in turn aﬀects the return from
the chosen project, based on which the manager is paid. Knowing this, the
manager has an incentive to manipulate his information if it is expected to
increase the worker’s eﬀort level via his contract, which may not be optimal
for the owner. This makes the manager’s incentive compatibility constraints
more stringent than those in the standard principal-agent model. As a result,
it is too costly for the owner to motivate the manager to gather information
and the centralized mechanism fails to induce the manager to gather informa-
tion. The resulting project choice is suboptimal and the worker’s contract
fails to provide eﬃcient incentives to the worker. Delegating authority to
the worker suﬀers from similar problems since the worker has to solicit the
manager’s information for project choice.
If authority is delegated to the manager, however, the owner can disentan-
gle the interlocking incentives. Delegation eﬀectively makes the manager a
4residual claimant in the subcontracting stage with the worker. Therefore the
delegated contracting authority motivates the manager to design an eﬃcient
contract for the worker, which is possible if the manager gathers information
and uses it for an optimal project choice.3 Thus the decision-making author-
ity and the delegated contracting authority are complementary. Of course
the eﬃciency beneﬁts of delegation do not automatically ﬂow back to the
owner. If the manager enjoys too much rent as a result of delegation, then
the owner may be better oﬀ with centralization. We show that delegation is
more likely to beneﬁt the owner as the manager’s cost of information gather-
ing becomes smaller, the manager’s information becomes more valuable, and
the worker’s cost of eﬀort becomes larger.
Other studies on delegation in a hierarchy include, among others, Baron
and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), McAfee and McMillan
(1995), Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1998), Macho-Stadler and P´ erez-Castrillo
(1998), Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001), Faure-Grimaud, Laﬀont and
Martimort (2003), and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004). Baron and Be-
sanko (1992), and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) establish equivalence between
centralized and decentralized mechanisms when risk-neutral agents provide
complementary inputs to production. McAfee and McMillan (1995) con-
sider a three-tier hierarchy subject to limited liability constraints, showing
losses involved in a three-tier hierarchy relative to centralized contracting.
Equivalence of a decentralized mechanism and a centralized mechanism sub-
ject to the possibility of side-contracting is established in a moral hazard
environment by Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1998), and Macho-Stadler and P´ erez-
Castrillo (1998), in an environment with additional coordination problems
by Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001), and in a principal-supervisor-agent
setup by Faure-Grimaud, Laﬀont and Martimort (2003).4 An additional con-
3In a similar vein but in a costly veriﬁcation environment, Choe (1998) shows that
the contract designed by the informed party can reduce the veriﬁcation cost compared to
the one designed by the uninformed party. The reason is that the informed party, in an
attempt to maximize the value of his residual claim, designs the contract to give himself
truth-telling incentives.
4The equivalence result can be also shown in our model. Suppose side-contracting
between the manager and the worker is possible under centralization. Then the owner can
implement the equilibrium outcome from manager delegation by oﬀering the manager the
same contract that she would oﬀer under manager delegation, and the null contract to
the worker. Since the worker’s eﬀort is essential, the manager will then oﬀer the worker a
side-contract that is exactly the same as the worker’s contract under manager delegation.
5clusion of Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1998) relates to the pattern of delegation:
the agent with superior information is more likely to be delegated. Mookher-
jee and Tsumagari (2004) consider a general adverse selection model to show
that hierarchical delegation is in general strictly dominated by centralization
subject to collusion due to double marginalization of rents.5 While not di-
rectly concerned with delegation, Itoh (1992, 1993) studies a multiple-agent
moral hazard environment to show when the principal can beneﬁt by al-
lowing coalition of agents, when agents can monitor each other. With the
equivalence result described above, his ﬁndings can be regarded as supportive
of delegation over centralization when agents have informational advantages
over the principal.
Our work diﬀers from, but complements these and afore-mentioned stud-
ies on hierarchy at least in two important ways. In our model, the manager
is not endowed with private information. Rather, he needs to incur private
costs to acquire information. Because of this information acquisition, there
are beneﬁts from delegating authority to the manager. In the above studies
on hierarchy, there is no a priori reason why a particular agent should be at
the center of the multi-tier hierarchy.6 It could be any of the agents supply-
ing inputs. In our model, delegation can beneﬁt the owner only when the
manager, not the worker, assumes the role of the delegated agent. Thus the
beneﬁts of delegation come from circumventing the irreconcilable conﬂicts be-
tween the information holder and the decision maker, which may arise under
centralization, preventing a certain outcome from being implementable.
Second and related, the managerial input and the worker’s input are quite
distinct. We believe that the manager’s information acquisition and subse-
quent decision making are what distinguish managerial inputs from those of
other employees in corporations.7 Roughly speaking, the manager’s decision
5The main diﬀerence between Laﬀont and Martimort (1998) and Mookherjee and
Tsumagari (2004) is that, in the former, the cost types are binary and the bargaining
power in the side-contracting at the collusion stage is ﬁxed exogenously. In Mookherjee
and Tsumagari, the bargaining power in the collusion stage is determined endogenously
by the initial contract oﬀered by the principal. Because of this, the principal can control
the outcome from collusion to some extent. Laﬀont and Martimort were aware of this.
They argue that their modeling choice will lead to the best outcome for the agents, hence
the lowest bound of what the principal can achieve when collusion is possible (footnote 9,
p. 286).
6As mentioned above, Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1998) is a notable exception.
7In his classic work, Simon (1960) argues that the most important role of managers is
6making can be identiﬁed with the choice of a particular distribution of prof-
its, while other employees’ inputs aﬀect the likelihood of proﬁt realization
given the chosen distribution. It is in this sense that the manager’s main
role can be described as that of direction setting. We thus expect optimal
incentive schemes for the manager to be quite diﬀerent from those for other
employees. Indeed we show that the manager, when delegated authority, can
actively aﬀect his own payoﬀ through the choice of project and the design of
contract for the worker. Thus incentives and authority are strongly comple-
mentary for the party who is delegated authority. For the worker, the scope
of such inﬂuence upon his own payoﬀ is limited, as is the case for employees
lower in the corporate hierarchy: the worker in our paper is paid an eﬃciency
wage under manager delegation.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model. Section 3 studies the centralized mechanism. Section 4 analyzes the
case of manager delegation, which is then compared with centralization in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses other relevant issues and extends our results.
Section 7 concludes the paper. The appendix contains the proofs of the
results that are not central to the exposition of our main ideas.
2. The Model
There are three parties, whom we call the owner, the manager and the
worker.9 The owner has two projects, denoted by ψ1 and ψ2, whose return
has the same support: x > 0 (success) or 0 (failure). The return is publicly
observable and can be used for contracting purpose. The manager can pri-
vately observe a signal θ ∈ {θ1,θ2} at a monetary cost of c > 0, which we will
call information gathering. The signal is a perfect predictor of a ‘state’ which
gathering, processing information, and making decisions based on this. According to him,
managing is synonymous with decision-making . Case studies by Mintzberg (1973) provide
rich supporting evidence for this. Radner (1993) also treats information processing as the
main task of managers, distinct from the roles played by other employees.
8One could take this as an incentives-based explanation of why stock options have been
the single most important incentive for CEOs in Anglo-American corporations (Murphy,
1999). While the use of stock options for non-executive employees was also growing in
the late 1990s (Core and Guay, 2001), the proportion of incentives provided through stock
options is eclipsed compared to that for CEOs (The Economist, 2003, p. 9.).
9We will use the female gender pronoun for the owner and the male gender pronoun
for the manager and the worker.
7is a random variable that assumes θ1 and θ2 with probabilities π ∈ (0,1) and
1 − π, respectively. If the manager does not gather information, then he
observes nothing and we denote this null signal by ∅, and the set of all possi-
ble signals by Θ = {θ1,θ2,∅}. The worker privately chooses ‘work’ or ‘shirk’.
The monetary cost of work is ` and that of shirk is normalized to 0. Given
θi, the success probability for ψ1 (ψ2, respectively) is pi (qi, respectively) if
the worker chooses work.10 If the worker chooses shirk, then the success
probability is r for either project and state.11 We assume that all the players
are risk neutral, limited liability sets a lower bound of 0 for payments to the
manager and the worker, and that reservation utilities for both agents are
zero. It then follows that both the manager and the worker ﬁnd any contract
weakly better than the reservation value. Hence, we assume in the sequel
that they will accept any nonnegative contract.
The owner wishes to hire the manager to use his information for project
choice, and the worker to exert eﬀort for the chosen project. We consider
two organizational structures that the owner may wish to employ for this
purpose. In a centralized structure, the owner contracts with the manager
who makes a report regarding his information, based on which she decides
on which project to undertake and what kind of contract to oﬀer to the
worker. We assume that the the communication of the manager’s information
is informal hence unveriﬁable. As mentioned in the introduction, some form
of transaction costs in communicating local information to the principal is
a necessary condition for eﬀective delegation. We take the simplest form
of transaction costs that the manager’s information is not veriﬁable. The
contracts in this case thus depend only upon the project choice and the ﬁnal
return. In a delegated structure, the owner contracts with only one of the
agents, who is delegated the authority to choose a project to undertake and
to contract directly with the other agent. Either the manager or the worker
can be the delegated agent. But the owner never beneﬁts from delegating
authority to the worker, which is shown in Section 6.2. Therefore we focus
on delegation to the manager except in Section 6.2.
The game trees in the two organizational structures are described more
precisely below. Under centralization, the owner ﬁrst oﬀers a contract to the
10Projects are identiﬁed with p and q and, states, with the subscripts.
11Our main qualitative results are robust to diﬀerent success probabilities when the
worker shirks, as long as they are suﬃciently small relative to pi and qi.
8manager that speciﬁes a salary siρ ≥ 0 for each of the contingencies that a
project ψi ∈ {ψ1,ψ2} is undertaken and a ﬁnal return ρ ∈ {x,0} is produced.
The manager accepts the contract, privately decides whether to gather in-
formation, and sends a message m ∈ Θ to the owner. Upon receiving m,
the owner selects a project to undertake and oﬀers a contract to the worker.
The project choice decision is denoted by a mapping C : Θ → {ψ1,ψ2}. If
the owner selected ψi ∈ {ψ1,ψ2}, then the worker’s contract speciﬁes a wage
wiρ ≥ 0 for each possible return ρ ∈ {x,0}. The worker accepts the contract
and decides on his action. Finally, the return ρ is realized, the manager and
the worker are paid, and the owner keeps the remainder, ρ − siρ − wiρ for
i = 1,2.
Under delegation, the owner oﬀers a contract to the manager that speciﬁes
a salary σρ ≥ 0 contingent only on the ﬁnal return ρ. That it may not
depend on the project choice is for expositional convenience. Relaxing this
assumption only reinforces our main insight because it would enhance the
performance of the delegated structure for the owner.12 The manager accepts
it, privately decides whether to gather information and selects a project, and
then oﬀers a contract to the worker. If the manager chose ψi ∈ {ψ1,ψ2},
then the worker’s contract speciﬁes a wage ωiρ ≥ 0 for each ρ ∈ {x,0}. The
worker accepts and decides his action. Finally the return ρ is realized and
payments are made: the owner retains ρ − σρ, the manager σρ − ωiρ, and
the worker gets ωiρ for i = 1,2. Figure 1 shows the time-line for the two
organizational structures.
— Figure 1 goes about here. —
The players’ objectives are to maximize their respective expected payoﬀs.
Since the worker is risk-neutral, the optimal contract to induce shirk from
the worker in either organizational structure is 0 regardless of ρ, and that to
induce work is a positive wage only when ρ = x such that the increment in
expected wage from work is `, the cost of work. In the sequel we take this
observation granted and denote the wage contract by wi or ωi as shorthand
for wix and ωix, respectively. Similarly, we can simplify the manager’s con-
tract under centralization to si0 = 0 and denote six ≥ 0 by si for i = 1,2.
12We believe that it also carries some realism. When the owner delegates the operation
of the ﬁrm to the manager, she would be interested in the ﬁnal performance but not in
the details of operation.
9The described structure of the game is common knowledge. We analyze and
compare the sequential equilibrium between the two structures. An ‘out-
come’ refers to a speciﬁcation of the manager’s action, project choice and
the worker’s action for each state.
Deﬁne ∆pi ≡ pi − r, ∆qi ≡ qi − r, i = 1,2. These are improvements
in success probabilities due to the worker’s contribution. We maintain the
following assumptions.
Assumption 1: πp1 + (1 − π)p2 > πq1 + (1 − π)q2.
Assumption 2: p1 > p2 > r, q2 > q1 > r, ∆p1 > `
x > ∆q2.
Assumption 1 states that the two projects are asymmetric under the
prior belief. That is, if the owner has to make a project choice without the
manager’s information, then she would prefer ψ1 to ψ2 provided that the
worker is induced to work. It is intended to resolve a tie-breaking situation.
Assumption 2 implies that an optimal project choice is necessarily state-
dependent, and that the worker’s input is valuable only when ψ1 is chosen in
θ1. These are minimal assumptions that make the incentive problems for both
agents non-trivial. To see this, suppose that the worker’s input is valuable
in both projects if they are optimally chosen, i.e., ∆p1 > `
x and ∆q2 > `
x.
Then the manager’s information is valuable only for project choice, but not
for incentive provision to the worker. In this case, the owner can provide
separate incentives to the manager and the worker, thereby implementing
the desired outcome through centralization. Therefore delegation and the
accompanied interlocking incentives do not have much bite. In Section 6.3,
we show this formally by demonstrating that delegation is never optimal if
∆p1 > `
x and ∆q2 > `
x.
3. Centralization
Under centralization, the owner designs contracts for both agents. Sup-
pose that the manager gathers information given the contract (s1,s2). Given
that the contract satisﬁes the manager’s incentive compatibility (IC), the
manager reports the signal truthfully. There are four possible cases of project
choice based on the manager’s report: (i) C(θi) = ψ1 for i = 1,2; (ii)
C(θi) = ψ2 for i = 1,2; (iii) C(θi) = ψj for i 6= j; (iv) C(θi) = ψi for
10i = 1,2. Since the contract that induces the manager to gather information
is costly for the owner, if the manager gathers information in equilibrium,
the information should be used. There is no point for the owner to know
the state if she were to induce the worker to shirk in both states. Thus if
the manager gathers information, the worker should be induced to work in at
least one of the two states. Moreover, Assumption 2 implies that the worker’s
eﬀort is valuable only when ψ1 is chosen in θ1. In all the other cases, the
owner is better oﬀ by inducing shirk from the worker since the payment to
induce work is nonnegative. Therefore if the manager gathers information
in equilibrium, the only outcome that the owner would want to implement
involves the worker working only when ψ1 is chosen in θ1. We show below
that the owner cannot implement this outcome.
Suppose that the owner oﬀers the worker w ≥ 0 to induce work in θ1,
and w = 0 to induce shirk in θ2. Based on the discussions above, we need
to look at only two possible cases of project choice where ψ1 is chosen in θ1.
Consider ﬁrst the case where C(θi) = ψ1 for i = 1,2. Then the manager’s
IC requires p1s1 ≥ rs1 ≥ p2s1, where the ﬁrst inequality concerns θ1 and the
second inequality, θ2. But this is impossible since p2 > r. The next case has
C(θi) = ψi for i = 1,2. The manager’s IC in this case is p1s1 ≥ rs2 ≥ p2s1,
which implies s2 ≥
p2
r s1 > s1. Then, in θ2, the owner is better oﬀ choosing ψ1
rather than ψ2. It is because the expected payment when ψ1 is chosen is rs1,
which is smaller than rs2, the expected payment when ψ2 is chosen.13 In sum,
there cannot be an equilibrium in which the manager gathers information and
the worker works only when ψ1 is chosen in θ1. Consequently the owner does
not beneﬁt from the manager’s information and, therefore, would not induce
the manager to gather information.
The logic behind the above result is as follows. Under centralization, the
owner needs to control both the manager’s incentives for information gath-
ering and truthful report, and the worker’s incentives. The manager’s infor-
mation is valuable for project choice and subsequent contract design for the
worker. If the marginal value of the worker’s input is negative for a project
selected based on the manager’s report, then an optimal contract should
induce the worker to shirk. The optimal shirk from the worker, however,
reduces the probability that the manager will be paid. Thus the manager
has an incentive to make an untruthful report if it is expected to induce work
13Recall that, in θ2, the owner oﬀers the worker w = 0 to induce shirk.
11from the worker even if it leads to a suboptimal project choice at the cost
to the owner. Eliciting truthful reports from the manager then requires the
owner to reward the manager more when his report leads to optimal shirk
from the worker (s2 > s1 in the second case above). This makes it too costly
for the owner to motivate the manager to gather information. Summarizing
the discussions so far, we have
Proposition 1: In no equilibrium under centralization, the manager gathers
information.
There are two reasons for the above impossibility result. First, the timing
of contracting under centralization is such that the owner designs the worker’s
contract after learning the manager’s report. Since the worker’s action aﬀects
the manager’s expected payoﬀ, the manager will then have incentives to make
untruthful reports, if necessary, to increase his expected payoﬀ. The resulting
stringent incentive constraints for the manager eliminate the beneﬁts of the
manager’s information for the owner. Therefore, if the owner can commit
to the worker’s contract that depends only on the return from the project
before receiving the report from the manager and making a project choice,
then she can motivate the manager to gather information. However this does
not necessarily beneﬁt the owner compared to when she can also use project
choice for contracting purpose. This is discussed in Section 6.1. Second,
under centralization, the owner has to design contracts for both agents to
control their respective incentives. As we will show in the next section,
delegation of authority to the manager allows the owner to disentangle the
incentives of the two agents. It relieves the owner from the onus of project
choice and contract design for the worker. The owner oﬀers a contract only
to the manager to provide the incentives for information gathering. The
manager in turn uses his information for project choice, based on which to
control the worker’s incentives.
In any equilibrium under centralization, therefore, the owner does not
make a positive payment to the manager who does not gather information.
The owner cannot distinguish between the states, hence induces the same
action from the worker. If it is optimal for her to induce shirk from the
worker, then the owner does not use the inputs from either agent. We call
this proprietorship. The owner’s expected payoﬀ under proprietorship is
12ZP ≡ rx. [1]
If the owner induces the worker to work under centralization, then project
choice matters. If she chooses ψ1, then she has to pay the worker `
π∆p1+(1−π)∆p2
in case of success, resulting in the worker’s expected payoﬀ of r`
π∆p1+(1−π)∆p2.
The owner’s expected payoﬀ is then




π∆p1 + (1 − π)∆p2
!
. [2]
If she chooses ψ2, then she pays the worker `
π∆q1+(1−π)∆q2 and obtains the
expected payoﬀ of (πq1+(1−π)q2)(x− `
π∆q1+(1−π)∆q2), which is smaller than
ZC due to Assumption 1. This leads to
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium under centralization, the owner oﬀers a
null contract to the manager. If ZC > ZP, then the owner chooses ψ1 and
induces the worker to work by oﬀering w1 = `
π∆p1+(1−π)∆p2 in case of success.
If the inequality is reversed, then the owner chooses proprietorship.
4. Manager Delegation
The owner continues to design a contract for the manager, who is now
delegated the authority to select a project and design a contract for the
worker. Since our main focus is when delegation can beneﬁt the owner,
delegation should necessarily implement the outcome that is not possible
to implement under centralization. More precisely, it is easy to see that
delegation does not beneﬁt the owner if it cannot motivate the manager to
gather information.
Proposition 3: Suppose the delegated manager does not gather informa-
tion. Then, the owner can induce the same outcome under centralization at
the same or a lower cost.
Proof: Suppose the delegated manager does not gather information. Then
he either chooses ψ1 and induces work by oﬀering ω1 = `
π∆p1+(1−π)∆p2, or
chooses either project and induces shirk by oﬀering ω1 = ω2 = 0. In either
13case, the owner can induce the same outcome centrally by oﬀering the man-
ager s1 = s2 = 0 and replicating the delegated manager’s decisions in project
choice and contracting with the worker.
In light of Proposition 3, we focus on the outcomes in which the delegated
manager gathers information in equilibrium. Again, there is no point for
him to gather information if he were to induce shirk from the worker in both
states. In addition, since the salary to the manager is at most x, he has no
incentive to induce work from the worker in state θ2 due to Assumption 2.
Hence, in any equilibrium we are interested in,
(MD) The manager gathers information, chooses ψ1 and induces work
from the worker in θ1, and induces shirk in θ2.
Note that (MD) is the ﬁrst-best outcome which is not implementable un-
der centralization. If manager delegation can implement (MD), the larger
total surplus of the ﬁrst-best outcome is the beneﬁt of delegation. However
the owner may not prefer delegation to centralization even if the ﬁrst-best
outcome is possible under the former. This is because she may have to leave
too large a rent to the manager to induce the desirable action. Delegation
therefore entails both costs and beneﬁts to the owner. The central aim of this
paper is to delineate when such beneﬁts outweigh costs, in which case mean-
ingful delegation will emerge endogenously. Given that the owner has a ﬁnal
say in the choice of mechanism, we could view such endogenous delegation
as an incentive-based explanation of transition from ‘personal capitalism’ to
‘managerial capitalism’.
We now turn to the subcontracting game between the manager and the
worker. Denote the manager’s contract by σ and the worker’s contract by
ωi ≥ 0 for i = 1,2, which is a payment for success when ψi is chosen. Con-
sistent with our assumption, the contact cannot be directly dependent on
the manager’s private information. When oﬀering a contract to the worker,
however, the manager may have acquired information. Thus the manager
can design the worker’s contract indirectly contingent on his private infor-
mation. That is, the worker’s contract can be designed to signal the man-
ager’s information: given ωi, the worker decides on his action based on an
inference on the manager’s information on the state. Denote this belief by
µ(θ|ψi,ωi), i = 1,2.
14The equilibrium leading to outcome (MD) is described in more detail
as follows: the owner contracts with the manager paying σ ≥ 0 in case of
success; the manager accepts the contract and incurs c to gather information;
if θ1 is observed, he chooses ψ1 and oﬀers the worker ω1 ≥ 0 in case of success,
which the worker accepts and chooses to work; if θ2 is observed, the manager
chooses ψ2 and oﬀers the worker ω2 ≥ 0 in case of success,14 which the worker
accepts and does not exert eﬀort.
Below we check the conditions for such a strategy proﬁle to indeed con-
stitute an equilibrium. Since the lowest wage to induce shirk is clearly 0,
ω2 = 0 in equilibrium. When ω1 is oﬀered, the worker correctly infers θ1,





Given ω1 satisfying [3], the worker’s equilibrium strategy is ‘work’ if and only
if ω1 ≥ `
∆p1 when ψ1 is chosen, and ‘work’ if and only if ω2 ≥ `
∆q2 when ψ2 is
chosen. The worker’s belief supporting the above strategy is µ(θ1|ψ1,ω1) = 1
for ω1 ≥ `
∆p1 and 0 otherwise, and µ(θ2|ψ2,ω2) = 1 for all ω2 > 0.15 The
manager’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ is then
V1 ≡ πp1(σ − ω1) + (1 − π)rσ − c. [4]
To check the manager’s incentive compatibility (IC), we consider possible
deviations by the manager. Once he gathers information, no deviation is
proﬁtable in θ2 as explained earlier. In θ1, he would get rσ regardless of the
project if he induced shirk from the worker; choosing ψ1 and oﬀering ω1 is
best as long as he induces work. Hence, the manager’s IC after he gathered
information is
p1(σ − ω1) ≥ rσ. [5]
If he does not gather information, he is best oﬀ either by choosing ψ1 and
oﬀering ω1 that satisﬁes [3] (i.e., inducing work) or by taking either project
and oﬀering 0. The conditions for neither to be proﬁtable are
V1 ≥ (πp1 + (1 − π)p2)(σ − ω1) ⇔ (1 − π)(rσ − p2(σ − ω1)) ≥ c [6]
14If the worker is induced to shirk, then project choice does not matter. We assume in
this case that the manager chooses ψ2 because it renders the equilibrium more stable.
15We focus on pure strategies of the worker only since the worker would accept any
positive wage oﬀer because nonnegative payoﬀ is guaranteed by shirking.
15and
V1 ≥ rσ ⇔ π(p1(σ − ω1) − rσ) ≥ c. [7]
Since [7] implies [5], the manager’s IC is summarized by [6] and [7]. In the
(ω1,σ)-space, [6] is satisﬁed in the area below a positively sloped straight line,
and [7] is satisﬁed in the area above a ﬂatter (yet, positively sloped) straight
line. It is straightforward to verify that the value of ω1 at the intersection of












Together with the worker’s IC condition [3], we deduce that if ω∗ ≤ `
∆p1
which is equivalent to ` ≥
c∆p1[π∆p1+(1−π)∆p2]
π(1−π)(p1−p2)r , then the outcome (MD) can














where σ in [9] is the smallest value of σ that satisﬁes [6] and [7] when ω1 =
`
∆p1. If ω∗ > `
∆p1, then the outcome (MD) can be implemented least costly
for the owner at the intersection of [6] and [7], i.e., when
ω1 = ω

















In either case, the owner’s expected payoﬀ is
ZD ≡ (πp1 + (1 − π)r)(x − σ). [11]
Proposition 4: (a) If ω∗ ≤ `
∆p1, then the owner can implement (MD) at




∆p1) in case of success.
The optimal subcontract the manager oﬀers the worker is ω1 = `
∆p1 and ω2 =
0. (b) If ω∗ > `
∆p1, then the owner can implement (MD) at minimum cost
by oﬀering the manager σ in [10] in case of success. The optimal subcontract
the manager oﬀers the worker is ω1 = ω∗ in [8] and ω2 = 0.
165. Centralization vs. Manager Delegation
In this section we compare manager delegation and centralization, and
analyze when the owner can beneﬁt from delegating authority to the man-
ager. For non-vacuous comparison, we assume that x is large enough so
that the salary needed to induce (MD) in Proposition 4 is less than x. The
owner’s expected payoﬀ depends on whether or not the inequality ω∗ ≤ `
∆p1
holds. We focus on the case where the inequality holds,16 whence the owner’s
expected payoﬀ is










We compare ZD with the owner’s expected payoﬀs from centralization and
proprietorship, ZC and ZP.
Let us start with a numerical example where parameter values are: p1 =
0.9, p2 = 0.3, q1 = 0.4, q2 = 0.45, π = 0.63, r = 0.25, ` = 4, c = 0.1, x =
20. These values satisfy Assumptions 1, 2 and ω∗ ≤ `
∆p1. The owner’s
equilibrium expected payoﬀs are calculated as ZC = 7.22, ZP = 5, ZD =
7.41, verifying that the owner is better oﬀ under manager delegation by
implementing (MD). To see how manager delegation performs relative to
centralization, we plot how the owner’s expected payoﬀs change as c, ` and
π change. The changes in these parameter values are all restricted to the
range consistent with our assumptions.17
Figure 2.1 shows how the owner’s equilibrium expected payoﬀs change
when c changes from 0.01 to 0.39. As c increases, ZD decreases while ZC
and ZP are independent of c. Thus the owner is better oﬀ under man-
ager delegation for lower values of c. In Figure 2.2, the owner’s equilibrium
expected payoﬀs are plotted against ` as ` changes from 4 to 7.8. As ` in-
creases, both ZD and ZC decrease but ZD decreases at a smaller rate. At
low values of `, the owner prefers centralization to manager delegation. As `
increases, manager delegation dominates centralization until it is eventually
dominated by proprietorship. Finally, Figure 2.3 shows how the owner’s
16The other case is analogous but the algebra is much messier. The details are available
upon request from the authors.
17In the examples of Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the value of c is set at 0.28, which makes ZC
larger than ZD at the start in Figure 2.2, and ZP larger than ZD at the start in Figure
2.3.
17equilibrium expected payoﬀs change as π changes from 0.3 to 0.8. Again
manager delegation dominates centralization and proprietorship for interme-
diate values of π. But it is dominated by proprietorship for small values of
π, and by centralization for large values of π. The patterns in which the
optimal form of organizational structure changes in these ﬁgures are indeed
general as discussed below.
— Figure 2 goes about here. —
Consider c ﬁrst, the manager’s cost of information gathering. From the
above example, we know that there is a set of parameter values for which
ZD = max{ZC,ZP}. Denote such value of c by ˆ c.18 Let us now ﬁx all other
parameter values but change c. Since ZC and ZP are independent of c, and
ZD decreases in c, ZD is the largest for all c < ˆ c. As c increases beyond ˆ c,
either ZC or ZP is larger than ZD. This is intuitively clear because higher
c means higher cost of inducing the manager to gather information under
manager delegation. Under centralization and proprietorship, the manager
is not compensated because he plays no role. This leads to
Proposition 5: Fix a set of parameter values and the value of c denoted
by ˆ c for which ZD = max{ZC,ZP}. Then ZD ≥ max{ZC,ZP} for all c ≤ ˆ c,
and ZD ≤ max{ZC,ZP} for all c ≥ ˆ c.
The next is `, the cost of work for the worker. Recall that centraliza-
tion results in suboptimal incentives for the worker since the owner does not
have access to the manager’s information. That is, the worker works in θ2
even if his marginal product is less than the cost of work. An increase in
` then magniﬁes this ineﬃciency of centralization. While an increase in `
also increases the cost of the manager’s compensation under delegation, the
delegated manager uses his information to correct the ineﬃcient work in-
centives for the worker. Indeed it is easy to see that the worker is strictly
worse oﬀ under manager delegation than under centralization.19 On balance,
the ineﬃciency of centralization is more pronounced than the increase in the
compensation cost as ` increases, which is shown in the proof of the follow-
ing proposition. Therefore we expect centralization to dominate manager
18In Figure 2.1, the approximate value of ˆ c is 0.216.
19Denoting the worker’s equilibrium expected payoﬀs by UC and UD under centralization
and delegation respectively, one can show that UC − UD = r`
π∆p1+(1−π)∆p2 − πr`
∆p1 > 0.
18delegation for small values of `, which is reversed when ` becomes large.
However, if ` becomes suﬃciently large, then proprietorship dominates both
organizational structures because both ZC and ZD decrease in ` while ZP is
independent of `.20 Summarizing, we have
Proposition 6: Fix a set of parameter values and the value of ` denoted
by `1 for which ZD = ZC > ZP. Then there is a nonempty interval (`1,`2)
such that ZD < ZC for all ` < `1, ZD ≥ max{ZC,ZP} for all ` ∈ [`1,`2], and
ZD < ZP for all ` > `2.
Proof: See the appendix.
Finally consider π, the prior probability of state θ1. The value of the
manager’s information is its use in identifying the diﬀerent states, based on
which to choose a project and provide proper incentives to the worker. There-
fore the manager’s information does not have much value when π becomes
too large or too small. If π is so small that inducing shirk is almost certainly
optimal, then the owner is best oﬀ with proprietorship. Similarly, if π is so
large that selecting ψ1 and inducing work is almost certainly optimal, then
the owner is best oﬀ with centralization without the manager’s information.
It then follows that delegation can be optimal for intermediate values of π. In
this case, the manager’s information is valuable since uninformed decisions
carry a large risk. It can be shown that the set of values of π for which ZD
is larger than ZC and ZP given other parameter values, is convex.21
Proposition 7: Fix a set of parameter values and the value of π denoted
by ˆ π for which ZD = ZC > ZP. Then there is a nonempty interval of π
with ˆ π as an endpoint, on which ZD ≥ max{ZC,ZP} with strict inequality
in the interior of the interval. Moreover, there is an interval [0,π1] with
π1 < ˆ π where ZP > max{ZC,ZD}, and an interval [π1,1] with π2 > ˆ π where
ZD < ZC
Proof: See the appendix.
We summarize the main ﬁndings of this section. Under centralization,
the owner is unable to motivate the manager to gather information. As
20In Figure 2.2, the approximate value of ` is 4.579 when ZD = ZC, and 5.509 when
ZD = ZP.
21In Figure 2.3, this interval is approximately given by [0.363, 0.617].
19a result, she makes a suboptimal project choice, and the ensuing contract
for the worker leaves the worker too much rent. If the delegated manager
gathers information, then project choice is optimal and the worker’s rent
can be reduced. Choosing manager delegation instead of centralization, the
owner thus trades oﬀ the beneﬁts of better information and lower incentive
cost for the worker against the compensation cost for the manager. The
beneﬁts of delegation increase as the manager’s information becomes more
valuable and the worker needs to be compensated more for his eﬀort. On
the other hand, the cost of manager delegation increases as it becomes more
costly for the manager to gather information. As a consequence, manager
delegation is more likely to dominate centralization if the manager’s cost of
information gathering is smaller, the worker’s cost of work is larger, and the
manager’s information becomes more valuable.
6. Further Discussions and Extensions
6.1. Alternative contracting under centralization
Under centralization, we assumed that the owner designs the worker’s
contract after receiving the manager’s report and making a project choice.
This resulted in the impossibility of an equilibrium in which the manager
gathers information. The reason for this is stringent incentive compatibility
constraints for the manager. Since the manager knows that his information
will be used (indirectly through project choice) in contract design for the
worker, which in turn aﬀects his expected payoﬀ, he is tempted to make a false
report to induce the worker to work even though it may not be optimal for
the owner. The stringent incentive compatibility constraints for the manager
increase the cost of using the manager’s information for the owner, which is
not in her interest.
Consider now an alternative timing of contracting in which the owner
simultaneously oﬀers contracts to both agents before receiving the manager’s
report and making a project choice. Furthermore, suppose that the owner
uses contracts that are based on the ﬁnal return only. Since the owner uses
only return-based contracts without the manager’s information, she cannot
induce diﬀerent work decisions from the worker in diﬀerent states: the worker
20is induced to work in both states or shirk in both states.22 In this case,
the manager’s information does not have the indirect eﬀect of aﬀecting the
worker’s action. Thus it is easier to elicit truth-telling from the manager
compared to centralization in our main model. Then it is possible to show
that there is an equilibrium where the manager gathers information and
reports it truthfully.
Proposition 8: Suppose the owner designs contracts based only on the
ﬁnal return from the project before receiving the manager’s report. Then
an equilibrium exists in which the manager gathers and truthfully reports
information, the project choice is C(θi) = ψi, i = 1,2, and the worker works
in both states.
Proof: See the appendix.
The main reason for the above result is that the manager’s report cannot
aﬀect the worker’s action via the worker’s contract. This reduces the man-
ager’s incentive to manipulate information, thereby relaxing his incentive
compatibility constraints. This alternative contracting can thus ameliorate
the manager’s incentive problem in the presence of interlocking incentives.
6.2. Worker delegation
The analyses of the previous sections indicate that manager delegation
can beneﬁt the owner only when delegation implements the outcome that
the owner could not implement under centralization. Then, can the owner
beneﬁt by delegating authority to the worker instead? Speciﬁcally, the game
under worker delegation proceeds as: the owner oﬀers the worker a contract;
the worker oﬀers the manager a contract; the manager decides on information
gathering and makes a report to the worker; the worker chooses a project
and makes his eﬀort decision. In this new game, the worker faces the same
problem as the owner under centralization when oﬀering a contract to the
manager. Since the worker’s eﬀort decision follows the manager’s report, the
manager still has incentives to make a false report to induce work from the
worker. As in centralization, this makes it impossible for the worker to induce
22The timing of contracting is also crucial. If the owner oﬀers the worker a contract
after receiving the manager’s report and making a project choice, then she can induce
diﬀerent work decisions from the worker even using return-based contracts.
21the manager to gather information. Consequently, worker delegation cannot
implement an outcome that cannot be implemented under centralization.
The worker makes a project choice and decides on his eﬀort without the
manager’s information, which the owner can replicate under centralization.
Proposition 9: The owner is never better oﬀ under worker delegation than
under centralization.
Proof: See the appendix.
6.3. Extension to ∆p1 > ∆q2 > `
x
In this section we consider the case that Assumption 2 is relaxed as
∆p1 > ∆q2 > `
x. Proposition 3 still holds. Relative to the previous case,
the following outcome can be optimal now:
(MD2) The manager gathers information, the project choice is ψi in state
θi, i = 1,2, and the worker works in both states.
This outcome may be implementable under centralization as well as under
delegation. In fact, if the manager gathers information under centralization,
this is the equilibrium outcome: in the proof of Proposition 1, Assumption
2 is used only to eliminate (MD2). We show below that if (MD2) is imple-
mentable under centralization, it can be done at no higher cost for the owner
than under delegation. Therefore, delegation may be preferred by the owner
only if it can implement an outcome, (MD) or (MD2), that cannot be imple-
mented under centralization. That is, the beneﬁts of delegation come from
circumventing the irreconcilable conﬂicts between the information holder and
the decision maker, which may arise under centralization, preventing a cer-
tain outcome from being implementable. The beneﬁts do not stem from more
economical implementation of the same outcome: even though the worker’s
incentives can be provided more eﬃciently under delegation, it comes at the
additional cost of motivating the manager.
Proposition 10: Suppose ∆p1 > ∆q2 > `
x. If (MD2) is implementable
under both centralization and delegation, then the owner weakly prefers to
implement it under centralization.
Proof: See the appendix.
22Corollary: If the owner prefers manager delegation to centralization, then
she should necessarily implement an outcome that is not implementable un-
der centralization, which is either (MD) or (MD2).
7. Conclusion
This paper has studied a model with a principal and two agents. One
of the agents, called the manager, can acquire private information that can
be used in choosing an investment project. The other agent, called the
worker, exerts private eﬀort that aﬀects the success probability of the cho-
sen project. The principal supplies funds necessary to undertake the chosen
project. Identifying authority as the right to make a project choice and to
design contracts for the agents, we have studied the equilibria of diﬀerent or-
ganizational structures depending on the allocation of authority. Under cen-
tralization, the principal retains authority while delegation confers authority
to a delegated agent. Our main results concern when the principal can ben-
eﬁt from delegation compared to centralization. A necessary condition for
this is that delegation should motivate the manager to acquire information,
which is possible only when authority is delegated to the manager.
Manager delegation results in an optimal project choice and eﬃcient work
incentives for the worker, which neither centralization nor worker delegation
can implement. These eﬃciency gains from manager delegation are weighed
against the costs of motivating the manager. Beneﬁcial delegation obtains
when the beneﬁts exceed the costs, which is more likely if the manager’s
cost of information acquisition becomes smaller, the manager’s information
becomes more valuable, and the worker’s cost of eﬀort becomes larger.
An additional conclusion from this paper is that the delegated agent has
more inﬂuence upon his own compensation than the other agent does, since
the delegated agent assumes residual claim in the subcontracting stage. This,
combined with the decision-making authority, can be viewed as a reasonable
portrayal of a corporate hierarchy where top managers, not other stakehold-
ers, are delegated authority, whose key role is that of direction-setting, and
who are often motivated through stock and stock options. An extension of
the current model that can more fruitfully elucidate the nature of incentive
pay in a hierarchy seems to be an exciting avenue for future research.
23Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6: We ﬁrst show that ZC decreases faster than










(∆p1)2 < 0. Thus both ZC and ZD decrease linearly in `. Since
ZC = ZD for the given set of parameter values and ` = `1, we have, from [2]
and [12],
πp1 + (1 − π)p2
π∆p1 + (1 − π)∆p2
=
(1 − π)∆p2x + (πp1 + (1 − π)r)σ
`1
. [A1]
































Since σ = c
π∆p1 +
p1`1





π∆p1`1 > 0. Therefore |
∂ZC
∂` | > |
∂ZD
∂` | around ` = `1. Since
both ZC and ZD are linear in ` and ZC = ZD when ` = `1, we must have
ZC > ZD for all ` < `1 and ZC ≤ ZD for all ` ≥ `1. Since ZD > ZP when
` = `1 and ZP is independent of `, there is `2 > `1 where ZD = ZP. Thus
ZD ≥ max{ZC,ZP} for all ` ∈ [`1,`2] and ZD < ZP for all ` > `2.
Proof of Proposition 7: We show ﬁrst that ZP is the largest as π becomes
arbitrarily small. Taking the limit as π → 0, we have ZD → −∞ and
ZC → p2(x−`/∆p2) < ZP = rx since ∆p2x < ` by Assumption 2. We show
next that both ZD and ZC are monotonically increasing in π. Diﬀerentiating





















Since ZD = ZC > ZP = rx when π = ˆ π and both ZC and ZD are increasing
in π, there is an interval of [0,π1] with π1 < ˆ π, on which ZP > max{ZC,ZP}.
Next, when π = 1, we have ZD = p1(x−
c∆p1+p1`
(∆p1)2 ) < ZC = p1(x−`/∆p1).
Since ZD = ZC when π = ˆ π and both ZD and ZC are increasing in π, there
is an interval [π2,1] with π2 > ˆ π, on which ZC > ZD.
24Deﬁne f(π) ≡ ZD(π)−ZC(π). Then, from the above, we have limπ→0f(π)
< 0, limπ→1f(π) < 0, and f(ˆ π) = 0. To show the rest of the proposition,
it is suﬃcient to show that f is strictly quasi-concave.























Note ﬁrst that limπ→0f0(π) > 0. It then suﬃces to show that f0(π) =























, which is negative because a > 0 and A < 0




∂π at most at one value of π as
desired.
Proof of Proposition 8: Denote centralized contracts by a payment s ≥ 0
to the manager and w ≥ 0 to the worker if x is realized, and 0 otherwise.
Since the owner cannot induce diﬀerent work decisions from the worker in
diﬀerent states, the worker is induced to work in both states or shirk in
both states. If the worker shirks in both states, then there is no use of
the manager’s information. Thus the owner chooses proprietorship and her
expected payoﬀ is rx.
Suppose the manager gathers information and reports truthfully. For
the owner to prefer this to proprietorship, she should necessarily induce the
worker to work in both states. Given the prescribed action by the two agents,
the owner’s project choice should be C(θi) = ψi, i = 1,2 due to Assumption
2. Below we solve for the equilibrium that leads to the above outcome.
Let dm ∈ {0,1} denote the manager’s information gathering decision
where dm = 1 if he gathers information, and dm = 0 otherwise. Similarly let
dw ∈ {0,1} denote the worker’s work decision where dw = 1 if he works, and
dw = 0 otherwise.
25Let V (dm,dw) be the manager’s expected payoﬀ given (dm,dw) and the
project choice described above. If the manager gathers information and re-
ports truthfully, then V (1,1) = (πp1 + (1 − π)q2)s − c. Given the project
choice described above, it is not optimal for the manager to make untruth-
ful reports if he gathered information. This is due to Assumption 2. When
dm = 0, let Vi(0,dw) be the manager’s expected payoﬀ when he always re-
ports θi, i = 1,2. That is, V1(0,1) = (πp1 + (1 − π)p2)s and V2(0,1) =
(πq1 + (1 − π)q2)s. The manager could also randomize, but we can ignore
this since randomization will be dominated by either of the above two. Given
dw = 1, the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint is then
V (1,1) ≥ max{V1(0,1),V2(0,1)} ⇐⇒ s ≥ max
(
c






Due to Assumption 1, (1 − π)(q2 − p2) < π(p1 − q1). Thus the optimal
contract for the manager is given by s = c
(1−π)(q2−p2).
Let U(dm,dw) be the worker’s expected payoﬀ given (dm,dw) and the
project choice described above. Given that the manager gathers information
and reports truthfully, the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint is
U(1,1) ≥ U(1,0) ⇐⇒ (πp1 + (1 − π)q2)w − ` ≥ rw
⇐⇒ w ≥
`
π∆p1 + (1 − π)∆q2
.
Thus the optimal contract for the worker is w = `
π∆p1+(1−π)∆q2.
The expected payoﬀ for the owner is then




(1 − π)(q2 − p2)
−
`
π∆p1 + (1 − π)∆q2
!
.
and the described equilibrium exists if Z ≥ rx.
Proof of Proposition 9: For worker delegation to beneﬁt the owner rel-
ative to centralization, the worker should work in at least one of the two
states. We show below that worker delegation cannot induce the manager to
gather information. Therefore the worker cannot make diﬀerent work deci-
sions depending on states: he either works in both states or shirks in both
26states. This leads to the same outcome and the same expected payoﬀ for the
owner as in centralization.
Let ω be the owner’s payment to the worker in case of success, and σi be
the worker’s payment to the manager in case of success when ψi is chosen,
i = 1,2. Suppose the manager gathers information and reports truthfully.
Then it is not in the worker’s interest to work in θ2. Suppose he does. Then
his expected payoﬀ is p2(ω − σ1) − ` if he chooses ψ1, and q2(ω − σ2) − ` if
he chooses ψ2. The worker’s IC requires these expected payoﬀs to be no less
than rω. But this is impossible due to Assumption 2. Thus we can focus on
the case where the worker works only in θ1.
Consider now the four possible cases of project choice the worker makes
based on the manager’s report: (i) C(θi) = ψ1 for i = 1,2; (ii) C(θi) = ψ2
for i = 1,2; (iii) C(θi) = ψj for i 6= j; (iv) C(θi) = ψi for i = 1,2. We
consider the manager’s IC constraints in each of these cases. In (i), they
are p1σ1 ≥ rσ1 ≥ p2σ1, which is impossible since p2 > r. In (ii), they
are q1σ2 ≥ rσ2 ≥ q2σ2, which is again impossible since q2 > r. In (iii),
the manager’s IC requires q1σ2 ≥ rσ1 ≥ q2σ2, which is impossible since
q2 > q1. In (iv), the manager’s IC dictates p1σ1 ≥ rσ2 ≥ p2σ1, which implies
σ2 ≥
p2
r σ1 > σ1. Then, in θ2, the worker is better oﬀ choosing ψ1 rather
than ψ2. In sum, there cannot be an equilibrium under worker delegation
in which the manager gathers information.
Consequently the owner induces the same action from the worker regard-
less of states. If she induces work from the worker, then it is optimal for her
to induce the worker to choose ψ1 since ψ1 is better than ψ2 given the prior
belief. In this case, the optimal payment to the worker is ω = `
π∆p1+(1−π)∆p2.
Given ω, it is not in the worker’s interest to choose ψ2. Thus worker delega-
tion results in the same outcome and the same expected payoﬀ for the owner
as in centralization.
Proof of Proposition 10: It is clear that, for either regime to implement
(MD2), the lowest wage for the worker in case of success is w1 = `
∆p1 in θ1 and
w2 = `
∆q2 in θ2. Let σ denote the lowest equilibrium salary for the manager
under delegation that induces (MD2). Then, the manager’s IC implies, in
particular,
πp1(σ − w1) + (1 − π)q2(σ − w2) − c ≥ (πp1 + (1 − π)p2)(σ − w1) [A3]
27where the LHS of [A3] is the manager’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ and
the RHS is his expected payoﬀ when he selects project 1 without gathering
information and induces work.
Let s1 and s2 be a pair of salaries for states 1 and 2 that induces (MD2) if
oﬀered to the manager under centralization. Then, they satisfy the following
equilibrium conditions:






ii) πp1s1 + (1 − π)q2s2 − c ≥ max{(πp1 + (1 − π)p2)s1,(πq1 + (1 − π)q2)s2};
iii) p1(x − s1 − w1) ≥ max{q1(x − s2 − w2),r(x − s1),r(x − s2)};
iv) q2(x − s2 − w2) ≥ max{p2(x − s1 − w1),r(x − s1),r(x − s2)}.
In the above, i) and ii) are the manager’s interim and ex ante IC constraints,
respectively, and iii) and iv) are the owner’s ex post IC constraints for project
choice. Conversely, if these conditions are satisﬁed, s1 and s2 would induce
(MD2) if oﬀered to the manager under centralization.
Given s1 and s2 that induce (MD2) under centralization, the expected
payment to the manager in this equilibrium is P(s1,s2) ≡ πp1s1+(1−π)q2s2.
If this is smaller than that under delegation, P(σ) ≡ πp1(σ − w1) + (1 −
π)q2(σ − w2), the claim of the proposition is proved because the expected
payment to the worker is the same under the two regimes. Hence, we consider
the other possibility below.
If P(s1,s2) > P(σ), then s1 > σ − w1 or s2 > σ − w2. Below we consider
three such possibilities one by one, and construct another pair, ˆ s1 and ˆ s2, that
satisfy the conditions i) - iv) above and P(ˆ s1, ˆ s2) ≤ P(σ). Since the latter
pair would implement (MD2) if oﬀered under centralization, this completes
the proof.
First, suppose s1 > σ −w1 and s2 > σ −w2. Let ˆ si = σ −wi, i = 1,2, so
that P(ˆ s1, ˆ s2) = P(σ). Then, i) and ii) hold for ˆ si because they are part of the
manager’s interim and ex post IC constraints under delegation with salary
σ. In addition, iii) and iv) also hold for ˆ si: Since ˆ si + wi = σ and ˆ s1 > ˆ s2,
violation of iii) or iv) would necessarily mean that q2(x−ˆ s2−w2) < r(x−ˆ s2)
which, in turn, would mean q2(x − s2 − w2) < r(x − s2) because q2 > r and
s2 > ˆ s2. But this contradicts iv) for s1 and s2.
Next, suppose s1 > σ−w1 and s2 ≤ σ−w2. Let ˆ s1 = σ−w1 and ˆ s2 = s2,
so that P(ˆ s1, ˆ s2) ≤ P(σ). Then, i) holds for ˆ si because
q2
p2 ≥ s1
s2 ≥ ˆ s1
ˆ s2 ≥
σ−w1
σ−w2 ≥ 1 ≥
q1
p1; ii) holds because the RHS is equal to (πp1 + (1 − π)p2)s1
due to Assumption 1, which decreases more than the LHS as ˆ s1 replaces
28s1; iii) holds because the LHS increases more than the RHS as ˆ s1 replaces
s1; iv) holds because q2(x − s2 − w2) > p2(x − σ) = p2(x − ˆ s1 − w1), and
q2(x − s2 − w2) ≥ r(x − s2) from iv) for si and r(x − s2) > r(x − ˆ s1).
Finally, suppose s1 ≤ σ − w1 and s2 > σ − w2. Let ˆ s1 = s1 and ˆ s2
be such that P(ˆ s1, ˆ s2) = P(σ). Note s2 > ˆ s2 ≥ σ − w2. Then, i) holds
for ˆ si because
q2
p2 ≥ σ−w1
σ−w2 ≥ ˆ s1
ˆ s2 ≥ s1
s2 ≥
q1
p1; ii) holds because the LHS is
P(ˆ s1, ˆ s2) − c = P(σ) − c ≥ (πp1 + (1 − π)p2)(σ − w1) ≥ (πp1 + (1 − π)p2)ˆ s1
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the IC under delegation and (πq1 +
(1−π)q2)s2 decreases more than the LHS as ˆ s2 replaces s2; iv) holds because
the LHS increases more than the RHS as ˆ s2 replaces s2; iii) holds because
p1(x−s1−w1) > q1(x−σ) ≥ q1(x−ˆ s2−w2), and p1(x−s1−w1) > q2(x−σ) ≥
q2(x− ˆ s2 −w2) ≥ max{r(x−s1),r(x− ˆ s2)} where the last inequality follows
from iv).
Thus if the owner can implement (MD2) under centralization and man-
ager delegation, she can implement it under centralization at no larger cost.
Since the same outcome is implemented in both regimes, the owner weakly
prefers centralization to manager delegation.
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Figure 1: Time-line under Centralization and Delegation 
The owner offers the 
manager a contract 
0 ≥ ρ σ  for  } 0 , {x ∈ ρ . 
The manager decides on 
information gathering, selects a 
project, and offers the worker a 
contract  0 ≥ ρ ωi  for 




The return ρ is realized, the 
worker is paid  ρ ωi , the 
manager keeps  ρ ρ ω σ i −  , and 
the owner retains  ρ σ ρ − . 
 
Time-line under Delegation 
The owner offers the 
manager a contract 
0 ≥ ρ i s  for 
} , { 2 1 Ψ Ψ ∈ Ψi  
and  } 0 , {x ∈ ρ . 
The manager decides on 
information gathering, and 
sends a message 
} , , { 2 1 φ θ θ ∈ m  to the owner. 
The owner selects a 
project, and offers the 
worker a contract  0 ≥ ρ i w  
for  } , { 2 1 Ψ Ψ ∈ Ψi and 
} 0 , {x ∈ ρ . 
The worker 
chooses the 
level of effort. 
 
The return ρ is 
realized, the manager 
and the worker are 
paid, and the owner 
keeps  ρ ρ ρ i i w s − − . 

















































































































































































































































Figure 2: The Owner’s Expected Payoffs 